Dominoes

I'm not really interested in making this a blog about politics, largely because that's a set of views that NOBODY cares about, but also because blogs about politics are, in large part, preaching to the choir. I doubt very much that people from opposite sides of the political spectrum (in the United States, and I should have made that clear from the outset because not everyone is from the US, shockingly) are going out to find each other's blogs, and that's a sad commentary on political thought in this country (but see my earlier statements about unity). Certainly, there are people with whose opinions I disagree who are still fine, decent people, but I don't really want to hear about their political views, and I'm sure the same is true in reverse.

But I do have to point out a big thing which I think many people are missing in the whole, "Iraq has become Vietnam II," thing: similar theories. I won't go point-by-point over the similarities and differences between Iraq and Vietnam because I think that's bullshit. Iraq isn't Vietnam, any more than Captain Kirk should be compared with Captain Piccard, or apples should be quantified against oranges. They have similarities, but comparing them is missing the point.

The point is: what can we learn from Vietnam (indeed, from any historical event) that can help us examine the present, in this case Iraq. And the thing is, there's a huge, gaping problem in people's justifications of Vietnam: the world is not Communist. That was the Domino Theory, and that is why we were supposed to be justified in going to "Police Action" in Vietnam. But there are fewer Communist regimes in the world now than there were before. So why didn't the fall of Saigon herald the doom of freedom, democracy, and world peace the way we were told it would?

History gives us two kinds of enjoyable lenses: rose and granite. Either we can see things more charitably, or we don't seem to see them at all. You can take your pick of which to use on the Domino Theory, or you can look it square in the face. The temptation is to use grandiose claims, and say that because Saigon fell and Communist troops didn't immediately invade California, the theory was bunk. Or you can look at relatively unconnected events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, and say that if those things happened, Communism clearly didn't win, and therefore the theory was wrong.

But Vietnam became Communist. China stayed Communist. Myanmar (or Burma, or whatever it's supposed to be called) became Communist. So did Cambodia, for a time. North Korea... well, that's another problem. In fact, South-East Asia has serious problems, possibly in result of Communism. So does Russia and the Ex-SSRs. So does Eastern Europe. Playing, "what might have happened if..." is fun, but pointless, because you can't convince anyone. So why play, "What might have happened if the US hadn't entered into the conflict in Vietnam?"

We now have a similar theory in Iraq: if we lose Iraq, the rest of the region will fall into anarchy and terrorism and 9/11 9/11 9/11! It's a compelling theory, precisely because a close study of history and a realistic look at the original Domino Theory shows us that it's all too likely. Probably more so, because the Middle East isn't terribly stable even with all the dominoes standing upright. So that's the justification we are given to stay the course, or sacrifice more, or surge, or whatever.

But we didn't go to war because of Domino Theory II, and that's why Iraq isn't Vietnam. In many ways, comparing Iraq to Vietnam is something that the administration would like us to do, because Domino Theory II is a compelling argument, when you cut right down to it historically. But they're selling us a line; we didn't go to war in Iraq because of Domino Theory II. We went there because Saddam Hussein supposedly had possible weapons of mass suggested destruction. That's why. And you know what? We were wrong. Don't look through the granite lenses; he didn't, and we were wrong. No matter what we do, whether we win or not, we are fighting for the wrong reasons.

I am not saying this because I hate Iraq, or because I hate George Bush, or because I'm anti-American. I hate all wars, and I don't want anyone to fight them, and I don't care why. But from a strictly historical standpoint, the facts are there: Domino Theory I was mostly a correct prediction (unless you want to get hysterical about it and pretend that it was ever about Viet Cong invading San Francisco) but a lousy foreign policy, Saddam Hussein did not have what we claimed he had nor did he do what we claimed he did, and Domino Theory II, right or wrong, is beside the point. From a historical standpoint. But also a lousy foreign policy.

And as a final note, I must also point out that, "What if..." cuts both ways. Proving a prediction right is based on cause and effect, and there is nothing one can argue that states, for certain, that the loss by the United States in Vietnam led Communism to triumph (as spelled out by Domino Theory I; it's hard for me to justify saying that Communism won the Cold War, for instance). It is possible that, no matter what, Communism would have triumphed everywhere else, and events would have proceeded exactly as they otherwise did, even if the US took over the entire country of Vietnam and set up a perfect, free, fair, and honorable government which continued to this day. And as long as we're living in a fantasy world, I'd like to win the lottery.

Human history is tricky when it comes to causality, and usually the only time we get to play the game of cause and effect is after both cause and effect have already long gone. So I won't play it, or mention anything which points to removing Saddam Hussein actually destabilizing an already terrible situation, or the introduction of Western influence into an area which is notorious for reacting poorly to said influences (vis. Israel). So don't believe that just because history seems to vindicate Domino Theory I, that it was anything more than a flimsy pretext for killing, either innocent or guilty, as Domino Theory II is turning out to be.