A Question of Pragmatism

Here's something to think about, and that's really all it is. A thought-experiment, if you will.

Take Hitler. I've previously covered the fact that I think I could be morally-pragmatic enough to kill Hitler. Not that it's the panacea some people seem to think it is, but still. So consider Hitler as a model of someone whom it might be morally-pragmatic to kill.

Consider two people. One is a German nationalist who hates Jews as much as Hitler, but can see that Hitler's actions will bring ruin to his beloved Germany. The other is a devout Jew who wishes to save her people from extermination. They both decide that they will kill Hitler because of their various reasons, and they both make plans which are identical in nature to do the deed.

Now, suppose you are moral, but pragmatic enough to agree that killing Hitler would be a good thing if not necessarily wholly good ("wholly is a word which really should be spelled differently). Suppose that the German nationalist kills Hitler. Is his action less moral because of the motivation behind it? The effect is the same as if the Jew killed Hitler: Hitler ceases to be alive. Is killing justified in the service of a moral cause, or is it merely justified in the service of a moral effect?

In other words, all other things being equal (I know they weren't in this case, but I'm moving from the specific to the general as one often does in these sorts of thoughts), does motivation for an immoral act which has beneficial effects govern the morality of that act?

And here's another question: suppose the person who kills Hitler does it in a way which is designed to ensure his or her survival? Is that more or less moral than someone who essentially commits suicide by assassination. Or, to put it another way, is it selfish and therefore less moral to give less than one's life to the cause?

The pragmatist, the truly pragmatic, thinks this whole thing is ridiculous. It doesn't matter why, it merely matters that Hitler is killed, they say. But I would wager that few people are that pragmatic. Consider it yourself and think about how your reactions to the two assassins differ. I'll admit that I find the Jewish assassin who is acting for a moral cause even if her actions are immoral to be the more moral actor, even if analysis tells me that murder is still immoral and the ends do not justify the means, nor are the effects made moral by the causes (and I do believe that those two statements are different, as well being different from the statement that the motivation doesn't justify the crime).

Does motivation matter to morality? Does effect? Or is action moral or immoral without regard to cause or consequence? You should think about it.